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1Introduction 
 Shortly after Dr. Mahathir Mohamad 
claimed victory as Prime Minister in Malaysia’s 
fourteenth general election on May 9, 2018, 
the new Finance Minister, Lim Guan Eng, 
disclosed that the country’s total estimated 
liabilities amounted to over RM1 trillion ($251 
billion), 80.3% of GDP, at the end of 2017 
(Shukry and Jamrisko). These figures presented 
a much higher fiscal burden than the former 
Prime Minister, Najib Razak, and his Barisan 
Nasional (BN) government had led the world 
to believe. Moreover, the campaign promises 
made by Mahathir and his Pakatan Harapan 
(PH) government to lower the cost of living, 
along with the public’s high expectations that 
the administration carry out urgent reforms, 
exacerbated the burden of servicing the trillion-
ringgit debt. The PH government pledged to 
remedy the troubled public finance sector with 
the principles of competency, accountability, and 
transparency (CAT) (Ministry of Finance, 2018b). 
 In this article I examine the conflicts 
between the government’s initiatives to meet 
the public sector’s debt obligations and enhance 
fiscal competitiveness, and its determination to 
jumpstart institutional reforms and improve 
the socioeconomic well-being of its citizens. 
I first provide clarifying information on 
the status of Malaysia’s government debt in 
2018. After a discussion of the fiscal policies 
introduced by the PH government in 2018 
and their credit impacts, I elaborate on the 
Ministry of Finance’s short-term financing 
solutions. Finally, I offer some analysis on 
several key areas for the Malaysian government 
to focus on in the long run in order to keep its 
obligations sustainable and move toward fiscal 
consolidation.
Composition of Malaysia’s Government 
Debt and Liabilities 
 Table 1 outlines the total debt and 
liabilities borne by the government of Malaysia 
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2on June 30, 2018, divided into four categories. 
Malaysia holds an A− sovereign credit rating 
as of the writing of this paper. However, its 
federal government debt-to-GDP ratio of 
50.7% is significantly higher than the median 
of other countries that are rated A− , estimated 
at 40.9% for 2018 (Shah). Nevertheless, the 
domesticity as well as the maturity profile of 
Malaysia’s federal government debt limited 
the risk exposure. First, 97.1% of federal 
government debt was dominated in ringgit, 
shielding the government from foreign 
exchange risks. Additionally, large domestic 
institutional investors, whose investments 
tend to be stable and long term, held almost 
two-thirds of all government securities. As a 
result, risks associated with shifting demands 
from foreign investors, who held 28% of 
government issuance at mid-year 2018, can be 
better monitored and controlled. Furthermore, 
54.5% of debt papers outstanding at June 30, 
2018, had a remaining maturity period over 
5 years, thereby curtailing immediate threats 
associated with refinancing (Ministry of 
Finance, 2018c).
 Government guarantees and public-
private partnership (PPP) lease payments are 
not direct debt obligations but contingent 
liabilities to the government. Employment of 
these off-balance sheet arrangements in lieu 
of direct borrowings is intended to alleviate 
the government’s financial and administrative 
burden. Government guarantees are awarded 
to statutory bodies, government-linked 
companies, and state government bodies 
and their subsidiaries (Ministry of Finance, 
2018c). They hold the government responsible 
for payment in the event that the borrower 
defaults. Government guarantees incentivize 
the aforementioned entities to take on public 
projects by protecting them against insolvency 
risks. In addition, with the government as 
an intermediary guaranteeing the loan, the 
lending institutions, gaining comfort from 
reduced counterparty risks, tend to offer 
lower coupon rates to the borrowing entities, 
thus lowering borrowers’ cost of capital. The 
BN government, however, did not exercise 
discretion in granting loan guarantees. 
From 2008 to 2017, government guarantees 
increased by nearly 250% from RM69.2 billion 
to RM238 billion, while federal government 
debt only increased by 124%. Because 
government guarantees are contingent 
liabilities, the government is not liable for 
repayment of the debt it guaranteed unless 
the primary debtor defaults. However, citing 
prudent debt management as the reason, the 
PH government included RM117.5 billion 
of committed government guarantees (i.e., 
roughly 50% of all government guarantees), 
on June 30, 2018, as its obligations, even 
though the debt had not defaulted. In the case 
of committed government guarantees, the 
government partially subsidizes borrowing 
entities (typically public infrastructure 
projects) for their cash flow needs to service 
debt when their own income is not sufficient, 
typically during construction and early stages 
of operation (Ministry of Finance, 2018c).
Table 1
Federal Government Debt and Liabilities
RM Billion Share of GDP (%)
12/31/17 6/30/18 12/31/17 6/30/18
Federal government debt 686.8 725.2 50.7 50.7
Committed government guarantees 102.1 117.5 7.5 8.2
PPP and similar liabilities 260.1 184.9 19.2 12.9
1MDB (net debt) 38.3 38.3 2.8 2.7
Total 1087.3 1065.9 80.3 74.5
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2018c.
3 Given the statutory limits on federal 
government debt (i.e., Malaysia set a self-
imposed ceiling of federal government debt at 
55% of GDP) and the expanding government 
guarantees, the previous BN government 
engineered “aberrant contracts” with the 
less scrutinized PPP mechanism to present a 
misleadingly prosperous fiscal picture. The PPP 
lease payments include rental, maintenance, 
and other charges for a variety of construction 
projects, such as schools, hospitals, police 
stations, and roads. As an example, Tony Pua, a 
special officer to the current Finance Minister, 
reported that the BN government had intended 
to award a contract that would pay RM1.5 billion 
to a private company to build a polytechnical 
university, when paying for the contract 
with direct expenditure would have only cost 
the government RM0.5 billion (“Malaysia 
Committed to …”). Similar approaches (i.e., 
choosing to utilize PPP instead of government 
debt or guarantees, albeit more costly) created 
a false perception that the BN government 
managed to sustain fast-paced economic and 
infrastructure development while reducing the 
debt-to-GDP ratio at the same time. Moreover, 
many of the contracts under PPP were poorly 
negotiated in terms of both the amount and 
the timing of payments. In his budget speech 
for the year 2019, new Finance Minister Lim 
disclosed that for projects such as the Trans-
Sabah Gas Pipeline and Multi-Product Pipeline, 
RM8.3 billion out of the total contractual 
costs of RM9.6 billion was already paid, even 
though only less than 10% of the projects had 
been completed. As of December 2017, similar 
lease payments for PPP projects and other 
liabilities, hidden entirely from the BN federal 
budgets, accumulated to RM260.1 billion. 
Since the PH government took control in May 
2018 and started reviewing, renegotiating, 
and postponing some of these infrastructure 
contracts, PPP and related liabilities have 
deflated substantially, to RM184.9 billion at the 
end of June 2018 (Ministry of Finance, 2018c). 
 The government singled out net debt 
from 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), a 
state-owned investment company established to 
attract foreign investments, as its own category 
(see Table 1) in reporting government debt and 
liabilities exposures. Funds borrowed by 1MDB 
were embezzled by corrupt officials under 
the Najib administration for their personal 
indulgence. Finance Minister Lim indicated in 
the 2019 budget that the government would be 
liable to pay up to RM43.9 billion to settle the 
1MDB debt.
 In summary, Malaysia’s debt and 
obligations remained elevated despite the 
significant progress made during the first 
half of 2018. More importantly, the debt and 
liabilities exposure served as a warning sign 
for the new administration to recalibrate and 
reform its fiscal sector. Economic growth in 
2018 and 2019 likely faces some contraction, 
especially since Malaysia’s open economy left 
it particularly vulnerable amidst the escalating 
trade war between the US and China, along with 
rising volatility in global financial markets. In 
fact, in October 2018, the World Bank adjusted 
Malaysia’s estimated 2018 GDP growth down to 
4.9% from an earlier prediction of 5.4% (Tan, 
“World Bank…”). A comprehensive review of 
Malaysia’s fiscal challenges and solutions is 
imperative to alleviate the risk of a heightened 
debt load that would restrain economic 
development. In addition to these concerns, 
it is worth noting that political motives are 
inherent in PH’s disclosure and discussion of 
its financials. Such political motives include 
further damaging the political image of BN 
and Najib as well as citing debt obligations 
as the reason for delaying urgent reforms. 
Consequently, although the improvements 
made so far are impressive, it is necessary to 
evaluate the government’s statements and 
projections with a healthy sense of skepticism 
and a critical mind going forward. 
Developments and Conditions that 
Could Further Increase Debt
 The government’s debt and liability (see 
Table 1) as of June 30, 2018, highlighted the 
imprudent and opaque fiscal management of 
the previous BN administration. While it is 
commendable that the new PH government is 
committed to greater transparency in public 
finance, many of its policies and actions since 
taking office, primarily aimed at fulfilling 
campaign promises, could increase its fiscal 
burden and thus lead to further deterioration 
in the government’s debt profile. 
4Change in Consumption Tax 
 The PH administration campaigned 
on abolishing the 6% goods and services 
tax (GST) introduced in 2015. The GST was 
highly unpopular among Malaysians, and the 
promise to do away with it was one of the 
most consequential decisions that led to PH’s 
victory. In June 2018, PH honored its promises 
and abolished the GST. A revised version of the 
sales and services tax (SST), which had been 
in place prior to the GST, was reinstituted 
in September 2018. The adverse effect on 
Malaysia’s fiscal position stemming from the 
GST abolition is threefold: loss in government 
revenue, costly enforcement, and narrowed 
revenue base. First, the new SST is applicable 
to a much smaller range of consumer goods 
and services, because it covers only 38% of the 
market basket for computing the Consumer 
Price Index, in comparison to 60% under the 
GST, leading to loss in government revenue. 
The shortfall in government revenue in 2018 
caused by both the switch and the 3-month tax 
holiday between the two tax regimes amounted 
to RM21 billion (Shah). As a result, Malaysia 
is estimated to record government revenue at 
15.7% of GDP in 2019, which would be 30% 
lower than its peak figure in 2012 and much 
lower than the average figure for emerging 
markets and developing countries (27.5% of 
GDP) (World Bank, 2018b). Second, collecting 
and enforcing the SST require substantially 
more budgetary allocation from the govern-
ment to the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia. 
Under the SST, rates imposed on goods vary 
between 5% and 10%, whereas the GST was 
levied at a fixed rate of 6%. Consequently, 
classification issues prevail, making it costly for 
businesses to comply with and for regulators 
to audit. The exemption of 5,433 items from 
the SST (compared with 544 items under 
the GST) worsens the classification issue, 
especially because the items on the exemption 
list were being updated on an ongoing basis 
(Augustin, “Economist...”). Moreover, the 
GST, as a type of value-added tax, was a system 
fundamentally superior to the SST, as it was 
levied at multiple stages of production or 
distribution, thus minimizing tax avoidance 
issues related to transfer pricing and vertical 
integration. The loopholes in the SST system 
will foreseeably lead to more regulatory 
challenges that are costly to resolve. Third, 
abolishing the GST increased the government’s 
relative reliance on oil-based revenues, which 
led Malaysia’s fiscal profile to be increasingly 
vulnerable to the volatility of oil prices: 30.9% 
of estimated federal government revenue in 
2019 is projected to come from petroleum-
related sources, compared to 15.7% in 2017 
(Shah). With the GST gone, compensatory 
fiscal measures to sustain and broaden the 
government revenue base should be a priority 
in order to keep government debt manageable.
Heightened Operating Spending 
 Since 2008, more than 95% of government 
revenue every year has been channeled toward 
operating expenditure (OPEX) (Yeap). The 
narrow operating surplus of less than 5% has 
led the government to incur higher levels of 
debt and liabilities to support development 
expenditure. The consolidated revenue account, 
which funds OPEX of the government, saw a 
drastic contraction from RM11.86 billion at the 
end of 2017 to RM450 million at the end of April 
2018 (Zainuddin). The strain on liquidity may 
force the government to seek financing under 
unfavorable terms in cases of external shock, 
thereby further worsening the debt profile. 
Two sectors of OPEX spending, civil servant 
compensations and subsidies, are particularly 
concerning. Malaysia’s ratio of civil servants to 
population is one of the highest in the world at 
1 to 19, compared to that of Singapore at 1 to 71 
(Augustin, “Pension...”)—34.5% of forecasted 
2019 federal government expenditure will be 
allocated to civil servant salaries and pensions 
(Ministry of Finance, 2018a).
 OPEX increased by 8.2% in 2018, largely 
due to PH’s efforts to increase socioeconomic 
welfare, specifically with fuel subsidies 
(Shah). The PH government allocated 
RM3 billion for the second half of 2018 for 
price stabilization measures on petrol and 
diesel. Similar to the abolishment of the 
GST, reintroducing a fuel subsidy aimed at 
realizing PH’s campaign promises to reduce 
costs of living, although at the expense of 
potentially increasing government debt and 
relying more on the revenues from the oil 
and gas industry. With global crude oil prices 
5on the rise, the government was subsidizing 
30 sen (approximately $0.08) on every liter of 
petroleum consumed by Malaysian citizens in 
2018 (“PH Fulfils...”). During 2019, a target 
subsidy, which applies exclusively to Malaysians 
who own only one car with low engine capacity, 
would commence to replace the initial blanket 
subsidy (Ministry of Finance, 2018a). The 
implementation of the target subsidy, if 
successful, would lessen PH’s fiscal burden on 
the path to reduce the cost of living for those in 
need. 
Near-term Operating and  
Financing Strategies 
Debt Issuance and Asset 
Monetization 
 A combination of bond issuance and 
asset monetization will be undertaken by 
the Ministry of Finance to address the short-
term financing challenges highlighted by the 
trillion-ringgit government obligations (Tan, 
“Short-term…”). Despite the widely publicized 
political and fiscal challenges, investors 
showed confidence and strong demand in 
Malaysia’s public debt instruments in 2018. 
In fact, during the first 9 months of 2018, 
the issuance of RM81 billion of traditional 
sovereign debt instruments, namely Malaysian 
Government Securities and Malaysian Treasury 
Bills, was oversubscribed by 129% (Ministry 
of Finance, 2018c). Nevertheless, considering 
that Malaysia’s debt-to-GDP ratio was almost 
10 percentage points higher than its rating 
peers in 2018, the government needs to 
exercise extreme caution regarding sovereign 
debt issuance going forward to mitigate the 
risks associated with a credit downgrade. 
 The government could address such 
risks by capitalizing on the opportunities 
brought forth by Islamic bonds, known as 
sukuk, which are debt instruments structured 
in accordance with Islamic laws that ban 
interest and speculation. Instead of coupon 
payments, sukuk payouts are leases or joint 
ventures derived from the tangible asset 
underlying the bonds. At the end of March 
2018, 40% of government debt was composed 
of domestic Islamic bonds (known as Malaysian 
Government Investment Issues) denominated 
in ringgit, a percentage almost triple that at 
the end of 2008 (13.9%). According to Moody’s 
Investors Service, Islamic government debt 
instruments are less volatile than traditional 
ones, partially because domestic investors held 
around 95% of these instruments as of June 
2018. The growing popularity of Islamic bonds 
for funding budget deficits adds diversity to the 
government’s borrowing profile, which in turn 
lowers its liquidity risks (Shah and Guzman). 
 Asset monetization refers to selling and 
leasing non-critical physical assets held by the 
government. Given proper procedures (e.g., 
independent valuation and open bidding), asset 
monetization can generate significant revenue 
to service the debt. Independent valuations 
of government-held assets are necessary to 
identify the ones that are non-strategic and 
the ones with poor returns. Open bidding will 
ensure prevention of abuse and maximization 
of proceeds. Furthermore, the government 
will seek to generate cash flow by reducing its 
equity ownership in non-strategic companies, 
which will simultaneously reduce the public 
sector’s interest in the financial markets, thus 
giving rise to a more robust private sector. 
According to a sensitivity analysis done with 
sovereign wealth fund Khazanah Nasional 
Berhad, the fund can raise RM4 billion by 
selling off 5% of its holdings in industries 
including but not limited to financial services, 
health care, and creative and media companies 
(Khazanah Nasional Berhad; Zainuddin). In 
its 2019 budget, the government outlined an 
initial step for asset monetization that entails 
setting up an Airport Real Estate Investment 
Trust and subsequently selling off a 30% stake 
to private investing institutions in hopes of 
raising RM4 billion.
Reviewing Infrastructure 
Spending
 In an effort to rationalize debt obligations 
incurred for developmental expenditures, soon 
after the 2018 election, the PH government 
started a thorough review of ongoing 
infrastructure projects to weigh the cost 
and benefits as well as the urgency of each 
project. In 2018, the government canceled 
two gas pipeline projects, the Multi-Product 
Pipeline and the Trans-Sabah Pipeline, 
6saving approximately RM15 billion (Ministry 
of Finance, 2018a). It also suspended and 
postponed a number of other capital projects, 
including the RM81 billion East Coast Rail 
Link and the RM60 billion Mass Rapid Transit 
3 project, seeking renegotiation of these 
contracts with respective vendors in terms of 
the amount and timing of payments. According 
to the World Bank, the contraction in PPP and 
other liabilities from 19.2% to 12.9% of GDP 
between December 2017 and June 2018 (see 
Table 1) resulted from canceling and postponing 
these transportation projects. Several projects 
that were deemed to have high economic 
multiplier effects will proceed under newly 
negotiated, more favorable terms. For instance, 
the RM5.2 billion Klang Valley Double Tracking 
project, which will rehabilitate 42 km of track 
to ensure the safety and reliability of the train 
services, will be re-tendered and is expected to 
continue with substantial cost savings (Land 
Public Transport Commission). Additionally, 
assertive actions taken by the Prime Minister 
and the Finance Minister to renegotiate or even 
completely shut down a number of massive 
infrastructure contracts entered into by the 
previous administration with foreign entities 
have attracted a lot of attention internationally, 
especially with regard to the Singapore–Kuala 
Lumpur high-speed rail and two major projects 
contracted by Chinese companies (see article 
by Hernandez in this volume).
Other Creative Approaches 
 The government also employed some less 
conventional strategies to address the near-
term fiscal challenges. On May 30, 2018, with 
the election results pushing patriotic spirits in 
Malaysia to an all-time high, Finance Minister 
Lim launched a crowdfunding initiative 
called Tabung Harapan Malaysia (“Malaysia 
Hope Fund”) to enlist public assistance to 
reduce government liabilities (Ministry of 
Finance, 2018d). As of the fund’s closing on 
December 31, 2018, it had raised more than 
RM200 million (“Tabung…”). The government 
announced a Special Voluntary Disclosure 
Program to encourage Malaysian taxpayers to 
disclose previously undeclared income. Under 
existing laws, tax evasion is subject to penalties 
ranging from 80% to 300% on the undeclared 
income tax payable. The Special Voluntary 
Disclosure Program granted taxpayers a 
reduced penalty of 10% on their tax payable if 
they came forward between November 3, 2018, 
and March 31, 2019, and 15% if they declared 
from April to June 2019. This program bridged 
the government’s short-term needs for cash 
and long-term goal to increase tax compliance. 
The Inland Revenue Board reportedly aimed 
to collect RM10 billion in tax revenue through 
this program (Surendran and Chua). 
Long-term Fiscal and Institutional 
Reform
 In November 2018, Lim redesigned 
the government’s blueprint to achieve fiscal 
consolidation. Malaysia aims to reduce the 
budget deficit to 3.4% of the GDP in 2019, 3% 
in 2020, and 2.8% in 2021 after taking into 
consideration the existing debt repayment 
burdens, decelerating economic growth, and 
global trade tensions (Ministry of Finance, 
2018a). The government’s projections are 
considered ambitious by Moody’s given the 
current fiscal policies (Shah). Consequently, re-
calibrating key expenditure items, broadening 
revenue sources, and restructuring the public 
finance sector are imperative steps to mitigate 
the risks of recurrent debt and fiscal challenges. 
Rationalizing Operating 
Expenditure 
 Rationalizing government spending, 
especially administrative and subsidy 
allocations, is imperative on the path of reducing 
government debt and eventually achieving 
a balanced budget. As previously discussed, 
narrow operating surpluses at around 5% 
have persisted in the past decade. Out of the 
OPEX budgeted for 2019, civil servant salaries 
once again made up the largest portion of total 
expenditure (26%), whereas retirement charges 
accounted for another 8.4%. Downsizing and 
potentially retiring government branches and 
programs with overlapping functions will lead 
to substantial savings in personnel expenses, 
which could then be channeled toward 
either retiring part of the debt or paying for 
social welfare programs. As an example of 
overlapping governmental programs that could 
7be consolidated, under the New Economic 
Policy in the 1970s, the government created 
a series of agencies to spur regional economic 
development. Then, in early 2000, a new set 
of five regional agencies was established with 
a similar mandate: to attract investment 
and address the uneven development across 
the country. Although there is evidence 
that both sets of agencies created economic 
opportunities for the respective regions, their 
functions are not distinct enough to justify 
the two separate systems. Consequently, those 
agencies presumably can be consolidated into 
one more structurally efficient system without 
the federal government incurring twice the 
administrative expenses (Murniati). 
 A review of current subsidy mechanisms 
also is essential to ensure their effectiveness. 
For instance, research has shown that 
convoluted agricultural subsidy schemes in 
Malaysia’s paddy and rice sector adversely 
impacted productivity while creating a 
heavier fiscal burden. Specifically, subsidized 
fertilizers, especially chemical ones, have led 
to deteriorating land and soil productivity. 
Moreover, under the current framework, 
subsidized agricultural inputs often are 
misplaced into the hands of unproductive 
farmers with few essential resources (e.g., 
land and labor) (Kari). Moving ahead, the 
government should work with private research 
institutions to weigh the costs and benefits 
of its current subsidy programs in an effort 
to optimize spending. The PH government 
approached the 2019 budget with zero-based 
budgeting, which entails rationalization 
of every expense item rather than simply 
modifying last year’s budget, a first step in the 
right direction.
Exploring New and Sustainable 
Revenue Sources 
 Government revenue in Malaysia has 
suffered a steep and prolonged decline since 
2012. As mentioned previously, general 
government revenue as a percentage of GDP 
saw a 30% reduction between 2012 and 2019, 
when the emerging market and middle-income 
countries in Asia recorded a 4% increase 
on average (World Bank, 2018b). Despite 
the strain in revenue, the PH government 
introduced several initiatives to boost the 
private sector and to encourage innovation, 
in addition to fulfilling promises from the 
PH manifesto, such as reducing road tolls 
and subsidizing households earning less than 
RM4,000 per month. The government did 
announce several new tax initiatives, including 
increasing casino duties to 35%, introducing 
levies on sugary drinks, and hiking tax rates on 
real estate gains, all in an attempt to broaden 
government revenue sources and scale down 
the reliance on oil-based revenues (Ministry 
of Finance, 2018a). However, these new tax 
measures are not sufficient in scope to cover 
the RM21 billion shortfall of lost GST revenue 
stream and to allow the PH administration 
to fulfill their promises at the same time. 
As a result, the government is turning to its 
wholly state-owned oil giant, Petronas, for a 
cash injection. With a special dividend of RM30 
billion in addition to a RM24 billion regular 
dividend to be paid to the government in 2019, 
Petronas will be funding 17.2% of government 
expenditure in 2019 (“Malaysia’s Oil...”). 
 Even with the cash injection from 
Petronas, Malaysia’s fiscal revenue in 2019 is 
projected to be only 18% of GDP, compared to 
27.5% for emerging markets and developing 
economies (World Bank, 2018b). Although 
introducing a new tax is likely an unpopular 
move from a political perspective, the low 
fiscal revenue and the reliance on the oil 
and gas sector need to be addressed as major 
constraints of future economic development in 
Malaysia. Generically speaking, there are two 
directions a government can go in establishing 
a new tax regime that also creates social 
benefits: “taxing the rich” and “taxing the bad.” 
For Malaysia, “taxing the rich” would manifest 
as either the introduction of a capital gains 
tax on equity investments or an inheritance 
tax, each entirely absent from the tax code 
as of the writing of this article. Inheritance 
tax is bound to receive significant backlash, 
because it is conceptually un-Islamic (i.e., the 
government would effectively become an heir 
to its citizens’ assets) (Salman). Introducing 
a capital gains tax is conducive to facilitating 
the distribution of wealth amongst income 
classes, although it would conceivably 
affect foreign investments to Malaysia in an 
8undesirable way. Alternatively, while Malaysia 
has some of the typical sin taxes in place, such 
as taxes on sugary drinks, gambling, alcohol, 
and cigarettes, a carbon tax presents another 
opportunity. Taxing carbon emissions would be 
beneficial to both environmental sustainability 
and the development of Malaysia’s alternate 
energy sector (see article by Gu in this 
volume), although it would hurt the interests 
of the country’s wealthiest and most powerful 
individuals and organizations, the most 
notable of which is Petronas. Developing a 
new revenue source will unavoidably damage 
public enthusiasm for the PH administration, 
but to maintain a healthy fiscal stance despite 
the cyclical swings in global commodity 
prices, post-GST Malaysia needs to establish 
structured, sustainable revenue measures on 
its way to fiscal consolidation. 
Reshaping Public Finance 
 For the PH government to realize 
its promise of CAT governance, systemic 
dysfunctions deeply rooted in the public 
finance sector need to be corrected. For 
instance, the government budgeted 12% of its 
total expenditure in 2018 and 9.2% in 2019 
on procurement, of which 30% can be saved 
if leakages and wastage caused by factors 
ranging from inefficiency and human error 
to nepotism, cronyism, and corruption (e.g., 
regarding the process of granting government 
guarantees) are cut (Amarthalingam). If 
transparency and accountability are better 
instilled in the government procurement 
process, taxpayers would be more likely to 
comply with collections knowing that their 
contributions will be put to good use, such as 
for structural improvements in the education, 
social, or economic sectors, rather than ending 
up in corrupt officials’ pockets. Research from 
the International Monetary Fund concluded 
that compared to countries perceived as 
“relatively highly corrupt,” countries that are 
“relatively less corrupt” have on average a 
tax-to-GDP ratio that is 12 percentage points 
higher (Baum et al.). In the long run, faith in 
government conduct will raise tax revenues 
and reduce enforcement costs. Finance 
Minister Lim stated that the government 
intended to draft a Government Procurement 
Act in 2019, although he has not committed to 
a date for the introduction of the act (Ministry 
of Finance, 2018a). In addition to addressing 
institutional failure and misconduct in public 
finance, enhancing governmental financial 
reporting and disclosure are prerequisites to 
CAT governance. Malaysia plans to convert 
government accounting to be accrual based 
in 2021 (Ministry of Finance, 2018a), which 
is more reflective of the economic events 
underlying transactions than the cash-based 
accounting that is currently employed. If 
the government were able to fine-tune its 
accounting policy to be in line with global 
standards, comparability with other nations 
would be enhanced, a plus for gaining better 
access to foreign capital markets and attracting 
foreign investments.
 All in all, to fulfill their political narrative 
of resolving legacy issues left behind by the BN 
administration and to liberate Malaysia from 
being a “global kleptocracy at its worst” (United 
States Department of Justice), current leaders 
of Malaysia will have to assiduously design and 
execute institutional reforms in public finance 
with patience and commitment. 
Conclusion
 As of June 2018, total debt and liabilities 
of the government of Malaysia stood at RM1.07 
trillion, or 74.5% of the GDP, down from 80.3% 
of GDP at the end of 2017. Although the new 
PH administration made headway in debt 
consolidation in the two months after coming 
into power, fiscal constraints remain a key 
challenge for Malaysia. The accumulation of 
Malaysia’s debt obligations accentuated many 
institutional issues the PH administration 
inherited from its predecessor and will hinder 
its ability to carry out much needed reforms in 
public finance and beyond. Policies enacted by 
PH to fulfill campaign promises, in particular 
the abolition of the GST and subsidization of 
fuel, further complicated the fiscal challenges. 
As of the writing of this article, PH and 
Finance Minister Lim have made promising 
progress in both disclosing and addressing 
the issues brought forth by the government 
debt with various strategies, including debt 
issuance, monetizing assets, and reducing 
developmental expenditures. I especially 
9applaud PH’s commitment to CAT governance, 
as it strengthens public trust and business 
confidence. 
 However, several fiscal challenges, such 
as elevated expenditures on civil servants, lack 
of structured revenue sources, and leakages 
in government procurement processes, are 
likely to persist in the near term. Some of 
the institutional challenges, notably related 
to corruption in Malaysia’s political culture, 
transcend the boundaries of government debt 
and public finance and will take much time 
and commitment to overcome. The silver 
lining is that foreign investors’ reactions to 
the government’s pledge of good governance 
in 2018 have been overwhelmingly positive. 
Rating agencies have maintained a stable 
outlook on government debt instruments 
despite the turmoil in politics (Shah and 
Diron). I believe Malaysia’s current leaders, 
in addition to taking timely actions to be 
more fiscally responsible, have succeeded in 
educating their citizens to be more cognizant 
of the constraints and risks brought forth 
by government debt. Whether the PH 
administration will be able to strike a balance 
between maintaining fiscal sustainability and 
carrying out highly anticipated, much needed 
reforms for its people will depend largely on its 
ability to manage public expectations.
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